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Abstract
Existing network detection techniques rely on SSIDs, network patterns or MAC addresses of
genuine wireless devices to identify malicious attacks on the network. However, these device
characteristics can be manipulated posing a security threat to information integrity, lowering
detection accuracy, and weakening device protection. This research study focuses on empirical
analysis to elaborate the relationship between received signal strength (RSSI) and distance;
investigates methods to detect rogue devices and access points on Wi-Fi networks using network
traffic analysis and fingerprint identification methods. In this paper, we conducted three
experiments to evaluate the performance of RSSI and clock skews as features to detect rogue
devices for indoor and outdoor locations. Results from the experiments suggest different devices
connected to the same access point can be detected (p < 0.05) using RSSI values. However, the
magnitude of the difference was not consistent as devices were placed further from the same access
point. Therefore, an optimal distance for maximizing the detection rate requires further
examination. The random forest classifier provided the best performance with a mean accuracy of
79% across all distances. Our experiment on clock skew shows improved accuracy in using beacon
timestamps to detect rogue APs on the network.
Keywords: DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service), Traffic detection, Fingerprinting, Evil
Twin attack, RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator), Clock skew
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Chapter One
Introduction

The continuous evolution of wireless networks technology and ubiquitous use of mobile
devices has fueled the spread of malicious activities on the internet. The adoption of wireless
sensor networks has progressively become an enticing focus for vindictive assaults. Wi-Fi
technology evolution and deployment as a low-cost infrastructure provide great opportunity for
indoor localization (Sun, 2014).Wi-Fi localization systems incorporates 802.11 protocol for
position accuracy and plays a pivotal role in determining receiver location (Zhang, 2019). Besides,
most wireless devices rely on these positioning features for optimum performance and accuracy.
Wi-Fi localization uses 2.4GHz and exploits signal path loss propagation due to Wi-Fi signal
variations to determine how close the receiver is to a certain AP. Continuous radio waves
attenuation with reference to inverse-square law indicates the distance can be estimated based on
the transmitted and received signal strengths relationship
As stipulated in (Chen Y. T., 2007), wireless network openness has propelled cybercrimes
such as IP spoofing, identity theft and DDoS attacks. Additionally, wireless localization over the
years has attracted substantial research exertion due to the increased ease to deploy and
interoperability of wireless fingerprinting localization (Yiu, 2017). IP spoofing attacks have
continuously posed an incurable threat to the internet as recent attacks on most popular network
infrastructure and websites prints the damaging effects of these attacks (Duan, 2008). Besides, IP
spoofing still is a contributive ingredient to identity theft and makes it harder to isolate network
attacks from legitimate traffic.
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This survey elucidates recent rising advancements with the concentration towards IP
spoofing and its effect to information security, privacy, and identity theft. This paper gives an indepth analysis on existing literature in mitigating the effect on Infrastructure based DDoS attacks.
Continuous adoption of wireless sensors has increased indoor localization feasibility in Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN) (Feng, 2010). On the contrary, spoofing attacks compromise the
legitimacy of users on the network and pose a serious threat by masquerading as legit nodes on the
network. These advanced characteristics affect information integrity as well as cause havoc on
network systems by injecting traffic attacks such as evil twin access point attacks.
Although traditional approaches proposed in (Chen Y. T., 2007) to address spoofing
attacks, cryptographic authentication has proven to offer additional infrastructural overhead and
computational power linked with cumbersome key management issues. Wireless localization
requires low-cost hardware and maintenance through dependency on the existing network
infrastructure such as IEEE 802.11 protocol. Wireless fingerprinting relies on the RSS values for
effective positioning on the WLAN. Moreover, these sensors on the network use node distance
between each other to determine their actual position (Kaemarungsi, 2004).
In this study, machine learning algorithms were used for classification to determine
centroid distance, evaluate classification accuracy, and determine relationship between the actual
and estimated distance of the nodes and access points in the signal space. Additionally, this
research study focuses on RSSI as signal input to detect rogue clients on the network and evaluates
beacon timestamps performance in detecting rogue access points on the signal space. This paper
is organized as follows; Chapter 2 provides in-depth analysis on previous research work in
detecting rogue Wi-Fi clients on the network and rogue APs on the signal space. In Chapter 3, we
describe machine learning techniques used in classification performance as well as methods used
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to detect and identify rogue Wi-Fi clients with reference to RSSI and clock skew. Chapter 4
examines and interprets experiment results through determining RSSI reliability and clock skew
effect in detecting rogue clients and APs. Lastly, Chapter 5 gives in-depth analysis on the research
study done and proposes future exploration of the research study.

Chapter Two
Related work
The rapid rise and adoption of IoT technologies has precipitated a large volume of research
to explore DDoS attacks, network identity theft, and their effect in the smart home environment.
The rising number of interconnected devices in the IT sector has led to unprecedented increase in
digital disruption. Besides, linked IoT devices have largely contributed to the widespread DDoS
attacks due to low security features integration. Furthermore, vast user information stored on the
cloud has powered the increase in DDoS attacks (Nawir, 2016). Likewise, spoofing attacks can
cause a variety of security breaches such as rogue access point (AP) masquerading as legit access
point. While there is a significant amount of research contributions with respect to the smart IoT
environment, the ensuing literature review will focus on prior studies that are most closely related
to our work.
The deployment of cryptography as native security approach to cope with the alarming
rates of DDoS attacks in IoT devices has yielded partial effectiveness. Besides, cryptographic
schemes are predisposed to node compromise and due to its infrastructural and computational
overhead; its partially functional (Chen Y. T., 2007). Moreover, wireless devices have limited
power thus makes it impossible to deploy authentication and key management. These predicaments
have proven to require additional human resource to manage the devices on the network layer.
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(Jana, 2009) proposed two different methods for estimating APs clock skews. First, they
used linear programming approach to estimate clock skew deviation by calculating difference in
the upper-bound time offsets and beacon arrival time at the fingerprinting node. Secondly, the
other method was based on identifying a line with the least square distance from all time offsets.
Furthermore, (Jana, 2009) proposed a more heuristic approach to differentiate frames sent by fake
APs and Real APs by evaluating beacon timestamps and frames transfer rate.
(Zander, 2008) hypothesized synchronized sampling that reduces quantization error and
improves clock skew accuracy by up to two magnitudes on low-resolution timestamps and one
magnitude on high-resolution timestamps respectively. As indicated in (Krishna, 2009),
calculating relative clock drifts can be achieved through examining two-way beacon frame TOA
location tracking.
Numerous research studies have conflicting arguments whether RSSI is a good Wi-Fi
localization candidate or not. (Sadowski, 2018) suggests indoor localization is hindered by several
factors such as noise, environment and manufacturers’ hardware capabilities thus affecting
position accuracy. Furthermore, (Sadowski, 2018) highlights Indoor Wi-Fi localization offers
better discriminative characteristics in node fingerprinting since it requires low cost to operate.
Alternately, (Navarro, 2010) emphasizes RSSI fingerprinting is not a good Wi-Fi localization
candidate. The objective of the research study is to investigate RSSI reliability in device
fingerprinting and explore how clock skew can be used in detecting rogue access points.
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IP Spoofing and Mac Filtering
(Li, 2006) proposed light-weight MAC (medium access control) security feature through
forge-resistant analyzing relationships from the incoming packets on the spoofed networks. This
approach introduces security within the MAC address as a fingerprint to identify multiple fake
devices using the same MAC address. As discussed in (Park, 2001), route-based packet filtering
was used to address proactive spoofed IP packets from reaching to their destination as well as to
identify reactive spoofed IP traceback flows. Moreover, DPF (route-based distributed packet
filtering) uses routing information to determine if the packet has a genuine source or destination
address. (Cota-Ruiz, 2013) proposed WSN localization technique which estimates sensor node
coordinates based on local spatial constraints by providing constant updates with reference to
adjacent nodes within the communication spectrum. (Nuo, 2012) proposed a cluster based WSN
localization algorithm to reduce measurement errors on multi-hop nodes and aimed at improving
nodes localization accuracy.
Although (Park, 2001)proposed route-based packet filtering, routers can be flawed with
rogue IP addresses as well as fake MAC address resulting to security breach. Adversaries can
bypass the strict rule set on the routers through masquerade and cause havoc on the entire network
infrastructure. Alternatively, these strict rules can discard legit frames or devices as the maximum
threshold number of users is reached resulting to DDoS attack. Furthermore, this paper proposes
a method for detecting spoofing attacks using RSSI (Received Strength Signal Index) as a Wi-Fi
localization technique.
Wi-Fi Localization Techniques
Fingerprinting and Traffic Detection – RSSI localization technique relies on the signal
strength to create a road map from various nodes readings from the network environment.
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Basically, fingerprint maps are reference points at predetermined points coupled with various
signal strength. Fingerprint mapping includes all measurements from different positions and their
corresponding received signal strength (Pei, 2017). Moreover, clock skew can be used for device
fingerprinting through monitoring and analyzing beacon/probe frames (Jana, 2009). Besides,
beacon timestamps have substantial advantages in identifying rogue APs on the signal space. Time
synchronization function (TSF) has a higher transfer rate (10 to 100 frames per second)
considering TCP clock synchronization latency and provides accurate beacon timestamp compared
to TCP timestamp delay (Jana, 2009).
Signal based – Wireless localization systems takes signal strength measures form different
access points to determine the connected device distance from all access points.
Signal based localization makes use of signal power level in reversed approach for AP to identify
multiple signals emitted by multiple devices on the network (Chen Y. &., 2002).
Angle of arrival (AoA)- This technique uses angle measurements of the RF signal from
the device. Besides, AoA triangulation doesn’t incorporate distance to signal but it also relies on
angles to determine the position of an object. Furthermore, AoA uses signal strength and difference
of signal arrival to determine the best angle of arrival (Wielandt, 2017). For effective accuracy,
two or beacons are required for location estimation. Although AoA technique seems effective,
there are limitations since AoA requires additional antennas resulting to high implementation cost
(Farid, 2013).
Time of Flight (TOF) – measures the time taken for a signal to travel from the object to
the reference point. TOF deploys time synchronization between when the signal was sent by the
device and the exact time the signal is received at the reference point and also incorporating signal
speed (Anjum, 2020). Although, TOF based systems are widely replacing signal to noise ratio
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(SNR) based systems; they have drawbacks in implementation since they have inherent challenges
in obtaining accurate measurements. Additionally, 802.11 protocol requires single frequency band
to operate and TDOA requires better time synchronization for better accuracy.
Even though, RSSI localization is widely explored to determine the node positioning on
the network, there exist lots of unsolved research problems. For instance, signal strength errors are
a common phenomenon ranging from unknown distance from the access point (Hyo, 2009).
Besides, most localization systems depend on wireless device transmission power with reference
to signal strength to determine node positioning. Since the propagation of signal is affected by
reflection, diffraction and scattering, there’s a substantial impact on measurement accuracy. As
indicated in (Bekcibasi, 2014) RSSI is affected by some factors such as environmental and device
errors that result to localization error and measurement inaccuracy.
Problem Statement
There have been many solutions proposed to improve existing limitations with common
standards across various layers in the IoT stack. Yet there remain challenges with attacks on
different protocols within the network layer. The focus of this research is to propose solutions for
a subset of network attack vectors or techniques used to create a distributed denial of service
(DDOS). Specifically, this study examines how to prevent network nodes from gaining
unauthorized access to an IoT network by exploiting IP spoofing or MAC address hijacking and
SSID manipulation. There are two approaches to identify these types of attacks such as traffic
detection and fingerprint identification (Tang, 2017).
Research Questions
Traffic Detection. Examines differences in traffic patterns.

Received Signal Strength

(RSS) will be used to identify the location of nodes in the wireless network.

TIME OF FLIGHT AND FINGERPRINTING BASED METHODS
FOR WIRELESS ROGUE DEVICE DETECTION

15

First, this research study aims to identify the optimal distance between valid and rogue WiFi clients connected to the same access point. While prior research suggests received signal
strength (RSS) can be used to detect rogue devices (Chen, 2007); the distance between Wi-Fi
clients and access points can significantly impact detection accuracy. This research study assumes
rogue Wi-Fi clients have hijacked mac addresses from legitimate nodes.
RQ1: What is the optimal distance to differentiate between rogue and valid devices on a
Wi-Fi network using received signal strengths (RSS)?
The null hypothesis is:
H1: There is no statistical difference between devices that are 5 meters from the access
point compared to devices that are 10 meters from the same access point.
Secondly, to perform near real-time detection of rogue Wi-Fi clients, computational
overhead must be minimized. One way this can be achieved is by investigating the tradeoff
between the detection accuracy and the amount of RSS data required. The more data required to
detect the rogue clients the more computational resources required to perform the analysis. If
calculations are to be done on IoT devices the limitation with computational resources is further
amplified.
RQ2: What is the trade-off between the amount of RSS data and detection accuracy?
The null hypothesis is:
H2: There is no statistical difference in detection accuracy for same devices with 50%
fewer data points connected to the same access point.
RQ2 will be evaluated using different machine learning algorithms to identify the impact
on detection accuracy by decreasing the sample size of the data. The complete sample size
collected for each individual device is 297 data points
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Fingerprint identification. There will be a significant difference between temporal
network characteristics of rogue devices compared to authorized devices. For example, the
duration field in a MAC address can be used to identify the chipset for a device (Cache J., 2006).
In instances where hardware of rogue devices matches valid nodes on the network, the nodes’
location or proximity within the network can be used to detect the rogue device.
While RQ1 and RQ2 are directed toward helping network operators to detect rouge devices
connected to their network, the next set of research questions are aimed at addressing client-side
vulnerabilities. For example, if a Wi-Fi user is connected to a rogue access point no safeguards
exist that can alert the user. Therefore, this part of the research aims to detect rogue access points
also known as “evil twins”. Furthermore, this research hypothesizes that at proximity RSS values
between devices may not provide enough variance to detect rogue devices. For example, an
attacker may place a rogue access point near a valid access point to mask any detectable differences
in received signal strength. In such situations, alternatives discrimination characteristics must be
used. One characteristic that has shown to aid in the detection of rogue devices is clock skew. As
discussed in (Arackaparambil, 2010) the clock skew is the temporal difference in the hardware
clocks between the access points and the Wi-Fi client.
Thirdly, this research study seeks to investigate if clock skews can provide enough
discrimination quality to detect rogue devices (Wi-Fi clients and access points).
RQ3: Do clock skews provide higher discrimination to detect rogue Wi-Fi clients
compared to received signal strength? The null hypothesis is:
H3: There is no statistical difference in clock skews between rogue and valid Wi-Fi clients.
RQ4: Does distance impact the discrimination quality to detect rogue access points? The
null hypothesis is:
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H4: There is no statistical difference in clock skews between rogue and valid access points.
For this research its assumed that IoT Wi-Fi clients will have the capability to compute,
maintain and compare historical clock skew data with new data from the access point. Since IoT
devices have limited processing power understanding the amount of data required to accurately
detect rouge access points is a critical component for designing security controls.

Chapter Three
Methodology
This section describes the experimental environment along with the hardware components
that were used for RSS fingerprinting. We conducted practical experiment to investigate whether
RSS can be used as a candidate for Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) localization. In our
localization model, we used Weka to process the measurements taken from the experiment. As
discussed in (Adewumi, 2013), RSSI mean can be used to determine the position of nodes in the
signal space at given distance. As indicated in (Kaur, 2015), machine learning classification
techniques can be used for prediction purposes and performance evaluation.
Hardware used in the experiments consist of a Verizon FIOS Actiontec MI424WR router
that served at the valid access point; Dell M3800 notebook with an Intel® Dual Band WirelessAC 7260 as our valid device and CanaKit Raspberry Pi 4 as our rogue device with a constant 5
meters incremental distance from 5 meters to 20 meters from the access point. We collected 297
RSS readings from both wireless nodes with varying distance considered. Based on a statistical
power analysis in Figure 3.1, 297 samples are required to detect a large effect size.
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Figure 3.1 Power analysis to determine sample size to detect large effect

Experiment I – Rogue Wi-Fi Clients (RQ1: Distance)
In this experiment, we deployed two wireless nodes: Dell as the valid node and Raspberry
Pi4 as the rogue node on the signal space and Verizon FIOS Actiontec as our AP (access point).
The two nodes were positioned 5M apart from the AP and with a 5m incremental distance from
the AP. Additionally, 297 RSS readings were recorded for analysis purposes and evaluation.

(a) Dell and Raspberry Pi4 @ AP1

(b) Dell and Raspberry Pi4 @ AP1
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(c) Dell and Raspberry Pi4 @ AP1
(d) Dell and Raspberry Pi4 @ AP1
Figure 3.2. Experimental setup
A Two-Sample Mean T-Test is used to test hypothesis, H1.
Experiment II – Amount of Data
Next, the amount of data required is examined. Since data collection can be a timeconsuming process that can delay the detection of rogue devices, RQ2 investigates detection
accuracy with 50% of the original data. The original dataset contains 594 data points for each
distance (i.e., 297 data points were collected for each device (Dell and Pi) at 5, 10, 15 and 20
meters from the access point) 148 data points were removed for each device at each distance to
create the 50% reduction. The modified dataset contains 298 data points. A total of 148 data
points was used for each device. Minimizing the amount of data collected will minimize the
amount of time to perform near-real time analysis. The optimal algorithm identified in experiment
I will also be used in this experiment to examine classification performance with reduced data.
Experiment III – Clock Skew
Clock skews are the inherent tiny drifts in the clocks of hardware devices due to variations
in the manufacturing process (Arackaparambil, 2010). (Kasera, 2008) showed that the clock skews
of wireless devices remain consistent over time. In their research that observed that, due to the
essentially zero latency and the availability of a high frequency stream of high precision beacon
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timestamps, the process of measuring clock skews became more accurate and effective in wireless
networks.
The objective of this experiment is to empirically validate prior research by investigating
the accuracy of using clock skews to discriminate between valid and rogue access points. To
accomplish this objective, two timestamps are collected: (1) the beacon timestamp, which is the
amount of time, in microseconds, that an access point has been active and (2) the packet arrival
time, which is the time the operating system receives a packet and will rely on the kernel to give
it a valid timestamp. The kernel will get the timestamp from either the network interface driver or
the networking stack. The packet arrival time is supplied as seconds since January 1, 1970,
00:00:00 UTC (also known as UNIX time or Epoch time). Timestamps will be collected from
access points at two distinct time periods. Raspberry Pi’s will serve as the Wi-Fi client which
receives access point broadcasts of beacon frames. Linear regression and statistical tests will be
conducted to examine statistical significance and effect size.

Chapter Four
Results and Analysis
Experiment I- Rogue Wi-Fi Clients (RQ1: Distance)
In this experiment, we have examined how RSS values change with reference to
different distances. RSS readings were taken with a 5-meter incremental distance with Dell and
Raspberry connected to AP1. Furthermore, we performed a statistical t-test to determine if RSS
can be used for wireless localization.
K-Means Clustering
In this section, we used RSS readings collected from Experiment I to compute and
determine cluster points distributions on the signal space using K-Means clustering algorithm.
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(b) 10M

(c) 15M
(d) 20M
Figure 4.1. Dell cluster points vs Rasp cluster points at distances between 5 to 20 meters (x
=Dell, x = Pi4)
The results were plotted from 5m-20m where distance served as discriminative feature to
determine cluster points positioning as shown in Figure 4.1. The difference in node positioning
can be visualized at 10M (Figure 4.1(b)) and the change in cluster pattern can be detected
compared cluster points positioning as shown in Figure 4.1 compared to both nodes connected to
the same access point at 5M (Figure 4.1(a)). The LQI (Link Quality Index) is largely affected by
the decrease in TX power and increase in distance between the node and the access point. Weak
AP signals affects the ability to detect rogue clients since the nodes are recording in almost similar
RSS value range.
Since the k-means results are not conclusive, the data was further examined with a t-test.
Results suggest a difference between devices can be detected based on their received signal
strength. As indicated in Table 4.1, p-values calculated in the T-Test suggest a difference in RSSI
distributions between difference devices connected to the same access point from the same
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distance. From the experiment, we can clearly pinpoint the p-value is less than 0.05; hence we can
conclude that is likely a difference in RSS values between rogue and valid nodes. Moreover, since
the p-value is lower than 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis.
Distance (meters)

No. of samples

RSSI Mean
P-value
Dell
Pi 4
5
297
58.99
2.90286E-02
57.58
10
297
71.94
1.02045E-70
63.84
15
297
75.65
76.70
1.77791E-06
20
297
79.99
5.01165E-39
83.74
Table 4. 1 Corresponding P-values and RSSI mean of the nodes connected to AP1
Based on the p-value results in Table 4.1 it is evident that the strongest difference is
detected at 10 meters. In statistical analysis, p value and effects are correlated in that the p value
reports if the effect exists while as the effect size shows substantive significance of the results. For
instance, any observed discrepancy is presumed to be explained by sampling unpredictability if
the P value is greater than the chosen alpha level (e.g.,.05). A statistical test with a large enough
sample will almost always show a substantial difference, unless there is no effect at all, in which
case the effect size is exactly zero. The P value is considered indecisive because it depends on the
sample size. The main result of the calculation may mean that only large samples were used. As a
result, the magnitude of the effect is calculated to test the effect of distance on signal strength.
Results provided in Table 4.2. suggest the largest effect sizes are observed at 10 and 20 meters. A
larger effect size suggests there is a larger difference in the distribution of RSS values between the
rogue device (raspberry Pi) and the legitimate device (Dell laptop).
mean (510m)
15 meters
20 meters
0.404979302
0.116024 0.693934605
5
-0.19854501 0.547907971
Table 4. 2 Effect size (N=297)
5 meters

10 meters

mean (1520m)
0.37

While a statistical difference and large effect size (>0.5) suggest signal strength may be
used to detect rogue Wi-Fi client’s; further examination is required to see how this difference
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actually performs as a feature and which machine learning algorithm provides the best accuracy.
To further validate the statistical results from experiment, three machine learning algorithms are
evaluated to investigate the detection accuracy.

The following popular machine learning

algorithms are used to examine the classification performance for detecting rogue Wi-Fi devices
using RSS values: naïve Bayes, multilayer perceptron, and random forest. Tables 4.3 - 4.6 contain
details regarding detection accuracy for discriminating between a raspberry Pi (rogue device) and
a Dell laptop (legitimate device) at different distances from the same access point.
Distance (d = 5
meters)
Accuracy Precision
69%
0.729

Recall
0.69

F
0.677

ROC Area
0.797

Accuracy Precision
82%
0.851

Recall
0.816

F
0.812

ROC Area
0.891

Accuracy Precision
62%
0.633

Recall
0.621

F
0.613

ROC Area
0.687

Naive Bayes
Multilayer
Perceptron
63%
0.656
0.633
0.619
0.632
Random Forest
83%
0.834
0.827
0.826
0.919
Table 4. 3 Classifier performance for detecting a rogue device (raspberry Pi) at 5 meters

Distance (d = 10
meters)
Naive Bayes
Multilayer
Perceptron
80%
0.814
0.798
0.795
0.881
Random Forest
91%
0.907
0.906
0.906
0.96
Table 4. 4 Classifier performance for detecting a rogue device (raspberry Pi) at 10 meters

Distance (d=15
meters)
Naive Bayes
Multilayer
Perceptron
56%
0.564
0.564
0.564
0.616
Random Forest
65%
0.651
0.65
0.649
0.729
Table 4. 5 Classifier performance for detecting a rogue device (raspberry Pi) at 15 meters
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Distance (d=20
meters)
Accuracy Precision
75%
0.759

Recall
0.751

F
0.749

ROC Area
0.787

Naive Bayes
Multilayer
Perceptron
76%
0.805
0.763
0.754
0.789
Random Forest
76%
0.804
0.763
0.754
0.783
Table 4. 6 Classifier performance for detecting a rogue device (raspberry Pi) at 20 meters

At distances ranging from 5 to 20 meters, results in the tables 4.3-4.6 consistently indicate
the random forest classification algorithm outperforms both Naïve Bayes and Multilayer
Perceptron. The best classification accuracy of 91% was observed at 10 meters. However, even
though a large effect size was detected at 20 meters the detection accuracy is significantly low
compared to the large effect size detected at 10 meters (78% vs 91%). Another observation
presented in Figure 4.2 is that the classification rate drops when the distance is increased from 10
meters to 15 meters beyond 10 meters, but then slightly increases from 15 meters to 20 meters.

Classification Accuracy

RSS Values
100%

83%

91%

80%

65%

76%

60%
40%
20%
0%
5

10

15

20

Distance

Figure 4.2. Random Forest classification rate for RSS values at distances between 5 to 20 meters

One assumption is that the noticeable differences between classification rates below 10
meters compared to classification rates above 10 meters many signal a demarcation point or
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threshold value that suggests the demarcation for using RSS values for detecting rogue devices in
Wi-Fi networks. To further investigate this assumption, the average classification rates above and
below 10 meters is presented in Figure 4.3.

Distance-based Classification
100%

Mean Classification Rate

90%

87%

80%

71%

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Distance <= 10 meters

Distance >10 meters

Figure 4.3 Mean random forest classification rate below and above 10 meters

It can be observed that detecting rogue devices using received signal strength values at
distances greater than 10 meters provides lower discrimination quality compared to devices that
are 10 meters or less from a given access point.
Therefore, the potential for using RSS may be proven most useful under certain attack
scenarios where an adversary has the capability to place a rogue device in the same proximity as a
legitimate user. However, in certain situations the adversary may not have the ability to place a
rogue device at the exact same distance as a legitimate user. The most challenging scenario, based
on the previous results, is if the adversary is within the 10-meter range. The hypothesis for RQ1
specifically examines this case. H1 states that:
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There will be no statistical difference in received signal strength between devices that are
5 meters from an access point compared to devices that are 10 meters from the same access point.
Since, the random forest algorithm outperformed the other classification methods in experiment I
it will also be used to address H1. The Raspberry Pi is a low cost highly portable device hence in
subsequent analyses it has been selected as the device for the adversary. In an attack scenario
considered the adversary does not have access to be within the same distance to the access point
but we assume she/he does have the ability to be within proximity. We examine the case where
the adversary is 10 meters from the access point and the legitimate user is within 5 meters from
the same access point. RSS data are collected from the Pi at 10 meters and the Dell at 5 meters
from the same access point. Results are presented in Table 4.7.
d= Dell at 5 vs. Pi at 10
meters
ROC
Accuracy Precision Recall
F
Area
Random Forest
85%
0.849
0.848
0.848
0.918
Table 4. 7 Classification accuracy for Dell at 5 meters and Pi4 at 10 meters from an AP
An 85% classification accuracy was achieved with the random forest algorithm. Therefore,
at close distances less devices than or equal 10 meters from an access point received signal strength
can help to detect rogue devices.
Experiment II- Rogue Wi-Fi Clients (RQ2: Data reduction)
Unlike Experiment I which investigated the classification performance for detecting
different Wi-Fi devices connected to the same access point at the same distance, the second
experiment analyzes classification performance for different devices connected to the same access
point at different distances with reduce data. Placing a constraint on the amount of data required
for analysis can provide near real-time analysis. Results from experiment II demonstrate that the
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accuracy for discriminating between wireless devices using received signal strength (RSS) does
not negatively impact performance.

d= Dell at 5 vs. Pi at 10
meters
Accuracy Precision
Random Forest
87%
0.894
Table 4. 8 Modified dataset with 50% reduction in data

Recall
0.866

F
0.863

ROC
Area
0.92

As can be seen in Table 4.8 an 87% classification accuracy was achieved with a 50%
reduction in data (148 data points for each device vs 297 data points for each devices). To examine
this in greater detail the original dataset was used with 20% of the data used for training and the
remainder for the test data. Results are provided in Table 4.9.
d= Dell at 5 vs. Pi at 10
meters
ROC
Accuracy Precision Recall
F
Area
Random Forest
86%
0.857
0.857
0.857
0.928
Table 4. 9 Original dataset with 20% used for training and the remainder used for test

Again, it can be observed that the received signal strength data contains enough
discrimination quality even with significantly less data. This underscores the value for using RSS
data as an attribute to detect rogue devices that may have access to be within proximity to an access
point as legitimate users.
However, results in Figure 4.1 show that the p-values after 10 meters goes down at 15
meters and then up again at 20 meters. This oscillating pattern may suggest a more stable method
is required that is not impacted by distance or latency. Consequently, alternate methods for
detecting rogue devices at longer ranges from an access point are required.
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One alternate method is to examine the differences in clock skews between Wi-Fi devices. Prior
research has shown that the clock skews of wireless devices remain consistent over time (Jana,
2009). Clocks skews will be examined between the rogue (raspberry Pi) and legitimate device
(Dell laptop) connected to the same access point. One access point is within the same indoor
location as the rogue and legitimate device. This access point has an SSID = 53BL2 and is within
close range to the Wi-Fi devices. The other access points are located outdoors from the Wi-Fi
clients. The distance is unknown but is at least 20 meters away from the Wi-Fi client devices.
Figures 4.4 – 4.7 illustrate the differences in clock offsets. In Figure 4.4 all devices (Wi-Fi clients
and access point are located within 5-10 meters. In Figure 4.5-4.7, Wi-Fi clients (raspberry Pi and
Dell laptop) are within 5-10 meters from each other, and the access points are located more than
20 meters from the Wi-Fi clients.

AP Clock Offsets
The clock offset of the i-th Beacon, o[i]
(microseconds)

2E+11

1.5E+11

1E+11
53BL2 (Pi)
53BL2 (Dell)

5E+10

0

-1E+10

0

1E+10

2E+10

3E+10

4E+10

-5E+10

Time since capture of first beacon frame, xi (microseconds)

Figure 4.4 Clock offset Dell vs Pi connect to access point with SSID 53BL2
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AP Clock Offsets
The clock offset of the i-th Beacon, o[i]
(microseconds)

30000000
25000000
20000000
15000000
Maniac (Dell)
10000000

Maniac (Pi)

5000000
0

-1E+10

0

1E+10

2E+10

3E+10

4E+10

-5000000

Time since capture of first beacon frame, xi (microseconds)

Figure 4.5 Clock offset Dell vs Pi connect to access point with SSID Maniac

AP Clock Offsets
The clock offset of the i-th Beacon, o[i]
(microseconds)

25000000
20000000
15000000
CYBERDEN (Dell)

10000000

CYBERDEN (Pi)
5000000
0

-1E+10

0

1E+10

2E+10

3E+10

4E+10

-5000000

Time since capture of first beacon frame, xi (microseconds)

Figure 4.6 Clock offset Dell vs Pi connect to access point with SSID CYBERDEN
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AP Clock Offsets
The clock offset of the i-th Beacon, o[i]
(microseconds)

25000000
20000000
15000000
Mene (Dell)

10000000

Mene (Pi)
5000000
0

-1E+10

0

1E+10

2E+10

3E+10

4E+10

-5000000

Time since capture of first beacon frame, xi (microseconds)

Figure 4.7 Clock offset Dell vs Pi connect to access point with SSID Mene
Visual inspection of the Figures 4.4-4.7 suggests a widespread or separation between
clock offsets for the rogue (raspberry Pi) and legitimate node (Dell laptop). To validate the
results p-values and effect sizes were computed in Table 4.10 and 4.11.

Dell

53BL2
Maniac
Cyberden
Mene

Raspberry Pi
53BL2 Maniac Cyberden
9.3E-265
0
8.7E-09

Mene

0.057417

N
53BL2
3342
Maniac
9962
Cyberden
26
Mene
25
Table 4. 10 p-values and sample sizes
Results in Table 4.10 indicate clock skews is an effective metric for detecting rogue
devices. In every case regardless of the distance between the Wi-Fi clients (rogue = Raspberry Pi
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and legitimate = Dell laptop) the access points results are statistically significant. While all results
in Table 4.10 are statistically significant, the sample sizes (N) for the Cyberden and Mene access
points are too small to detect a large or medium effect and therefore, these results should be
interpreted with caution. Further analysis is required. The effect sizes for 53BL2 and Maniac are
presented in Table 4.11.
53BL2
(Pi)

Maniac (Pi)

53BL2
(Dell)
-0.422913
Maniac
(Dell)
0.732330567
Table 4. 11 Effect size based on Clock Skews
It can be observed from Table 4.11 that the largest effect size was detected between the
rogue (Pi) and legitimate device (Dell) when connected to the Maniac access point. The distance
between this access point and the Wi-Fi clients is significantly further away compared to the
53BL2 access point. This result suggests strong support for using clock skews over received signal
strength values for large distances between Wi-Fi clients and access points. Specifically, large
effect sizes can be detected between rogue and legitimate Wi-Fi clients connected at distances
greater than 20 meters from an access point. Further investigation is required to examine the
impact of the sample sizes. However, in both cases sample sizes are large enough to detect a large
effect with a statistical power of 0.8. Experiment III investigates using clock skews for detecting
rogue access points also known as “evil twins.
Experiment III- Clock Skew
Access points (AP’s) broadcast beacon frames to alert any Wi-Fi client that they are willing
to accept a connection. Beacon frames were broadcast to the Raspberry Pi Wi-Fi client during two
different time periods: November 2020 and March 2021. Data for all access points (AP’s) within
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range of the Raspberry Pi was collected for one minute. Since the beacon frames and packet
timestamps are in different units (microseconds vs Epoch time in seconds) the first packet is
converted to time 0. The difference of each successive packet is computed as the difference
between the previous packet time. Figure 4.8 presents the clock offsets of four different access
points obtained from a Raspberry Pi Wi-Fi client during November 2020. Results demonstrate
that after 15 seconds (15,000,000 microseconds) clock offsets appear to represent unique linear
functions. This suggests clock offsets provide good discrimination quality after 15 seconds.

The clock offset of the i-th Beacon , o[i]
(micro seconds)

Actual AP Clock Offsets
1400

y = 3E-05x + 5.6279
R² = 0.999

1200

y = 2E-05x + 4.9983
R² = 0.9966
y = 2E-05x + 10.131
R² = 0.9953

1000
800

rogue access point

600

AP1
AP3

y = 1E-05x + 11.192
R² = 0.9871

400

AP2

200
0
0

5000000 10000000 15000000 20000000 25000000 30000000 35000000 40000000 45000000

Time since capture of first beacon frame, xi (microseconds)

Figure 4.8 Access point (AP) Actual Clock Offsets (November 2020)
To further examine the predictive quality of clock offsets a linear regression was performed
with 75% of the data for training and 25% of the data for testing.
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The clock offset of the i-th Beacon, o[i]
(microseconds)

Predicted AP Clock Offsets
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predicted offsets

1200
1000
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600
400
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200
0
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5000000 10000000 15000000 20000000 25000000 30000000 35000000 40000000 45000000

Time since capture of first beacon frame, xi (micro seconds)

Figure 4.9 Access point (AP) Predicted Clock Offsets (November 2020)

As can be observed in Figure 4.9 the predicted clock offsets align with their respective
linear functions.
To further verify results obtained in Figure 4.8 the experiment was conducted using a
different Raspberry Pi Wi-Fi client several months later in March 2021. Results are presented in
Figure 4.10.
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Actual AP Clock Offsets
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Figure 4.10 Access point (AP) Actual Clock Offsets (March 2021)

Like the same experiment conducted in November 2020 there is a clear separation between
the different access points using clock offsets as a feature. A clean separation appears after about
7 seconds (7,000,000 microseconds) from the arrival of the first beacon frame.
To validate the differences observed in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 statistical t-test were
performed with access points that had at least 97 beacon frames (i.e. n = 97 data points). Access
points that had fewer than 97 beacon frames were excluded from the analysis. To perform the
statistical tests, we made sure all datasets were balanced. AP2 only had 97 data points so to make
the data balanced only 97 data points were chosen. A power analysis with 97 data points is only
able to detect moderate effect size of 0.5 with a power of 80%. Consequently, one access point
was removed for November (AP1) and one from March 2021 (AP6) since they had fewer than 97
beacon frames. Results from the t-test for data collected in November 2020 and March 2021 are
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presented in Table 4.12 and Table 4.14 and respective effect sizes are provided in Table 4.13 and
Table 4.15.
Rogue AP
AP2
AP3
Rogue AP
7.37214E-08 0.029861
AP2
7.37214E-08
7.44E-39
AP3
0.029861298
7.44E-39
Table 4. 12 t-test p-values Clock Skews (November 2020)

AP2
AP3
Rogue AP
0.404892 -0.16452093
Table 4. 13 Clock skew effect size (November 2020)

It can be observed that the differences in clock skew distributions between the rogue access
point and other access points is statistically significant (p< 0.05). In addition, the effect size for
AP2 is higher than AP3, but in both cases only a moderate (AP2) to small effect (AP3) are detected.
Rogue AP

AP4
0.007381

AP5
1.43E-07
6.80E-08

Rogue AP
AP4
0.007381
AP5
1.43E-07 6.80E-08
Table 4. 14 t-test p-values Clock Skews (March 2021)
AP4

AP5

Rogue AP
-0.09718 0.0744608
Table 4. 15 Clock skew effect size (March 2021)

During the March 2021 collection period higher results were observed. The differences in
clock skew distributions between the rogue access point and other access points is statistically
significant (p< 0.05), and the effect size for AP4 is higher than AP5. A large effect was detected
for both access points. The combined results of p-value and effect sizes for both time periods
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provides support for using clock skews to detect rogue access points. The main difference between
the two time periods is that large effect sizes were detected during the second time (March 2021)
compared to the first time (November 2020) with the same sample sizes of only 97 beacon frames.
Future research will investigate the possible causes for the differences in effect sizes.

Chapter Five
Conclusion and Future Exploration

In this paper, we have exhaustively analyzed Wi-Fi localization based on RSSI and packetbased time synchronization on the IEEE 802.11 protocol on highlighting the impact on network
effectiveness and performance. This study investigates the RSSI pattern through RSSI distribution
in the signal space. RSS based positioning scheme was used to test for reliability and accuracy of
using RSSI as a determinant feature to identify rogue Wi-Fi clients. Wi-Fi localization under these
conditions remains a fundamental platform to explore reflecting on the application of RSSI in
identifying the positioning of the rogue AP on the signal space.
The main attraction to RSSI as a metric is that the measurement and calculation is simple,
and less tasking compared to other localization metrics. Increased frequency has cultivated the
need to focus on wireless sensor networks due to their recent adoption and applicability on a range
of devices in the IoT environments. Network architectural designs over the years have faced the
challenge in providing clock synchronization on the sensor network since there are many
applications that process large chunks of data on the networks. This paper explored the
effectiveness of beacon time synchronization on identifying the presence of rogue APs on the
signal space. When a device wants to send a packet from the AP to the node, the device broadcast
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its beacon frames to announce its presence on wireless network. A summary of results from this
research is provided in Table 5.1.
Hypothesis

Description

Result

H1

There is no statistical difference
between devices that are 5 meters
from the access point compared to
devices that are 10 meters from
the same access point.

Supported. While there was some
volatility in signal strength as the distance
between devices and the access point was
increased from 5-20 meters, the mean
effect size and was larger when the devices
were less than 10 meters from the access
point than when the devices were more
than 15 meters from the access point
(Table 4.2: 0.41 for d <10m and 0.37 for
d>15m). The same was observed with the
classification rates (Figure 4.3: 87% for d
<10m and 71% for d>15m). At proximity
when one device was 5m from the access
point and the other devices was placed at
10m from the access point an 85%
accuracy was achieved (Table 4.7).

H2

There is no statistical difference in
detection accuracy for same
devices with 50% fewer data points
connected to the same access point.

H3

H4

A significant decrease is accuracy was not
observed with a 50% reduction in data.
This suggests a small amount of data
collection is required facilitating near realtime analysis. An 86% detection accuracy
was achieved (Table 4.9).
There is no statistical difference in Supported. At a distance of at least 20m
clock skews between rogue and from the access points a large effect size
valid Wi-Fi clients.
was detected using clock skews (Table
4.11). Considering results obtained for
H1, this result suggests clock skews
provide better discrimination quality
compared to signal strength at distances
greater than 20 meters.
There is no statistical difference in Supported. In 2 out of the 3 test cases a
clock skews between rogue and
large effect was detected between the
valid access points.
rouge and valid access points. This was
observed when the distance between the
rogue and valid access points was 20m or
more. This is consistent with results
obtained for H3 and addresses limitations
with using signal strength for distances
more than 15m as observed with results
from H1. Further research is required to
understand the one exception when a small
effect was detected.

Table 5. 1 Summary of results
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The presence of rogue APs on the signal space has contributed to identity theft, service
unavailability and has jeopardized information integrity. Besides, the adversaries have widely
exposed the CIAD metrics resulting to user manipulation and distributed denial of service
(DDOS).
Future exploration

Our approach focused on the hardware-based traffic detection and model implemented on
physical and datalink of the network layered model. We propose more diverse fingerprint
identification technique which will explore significant difference between temporal network
characteristics of rogue devices compared to authorized devices. For example, the duration field
in a MAC address can be used to identify the chipset for a device (Cache, 2006). In instances
where hardware of rogue devices matches valid nodes on the network, the nodes’ location or
proximity within the network can be used to detect the rogue device.
Moreover, synchronous timestamping approach offers a valid technique to detect and
identify rogue APs. The difference in clock skew signals presence of rogue APs and can be
implemented into two layered forms; software-based and infrastructural-based (hardware-based).
This paper solely focused on the infrastructural-based section of the research study. Likewise, we
suggest studies to inter-connect the software based and hardware-based time synchronization to
minimize the overhead when there is a large pool of devices broadcasting their beacon frames.
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